Restricting Access to Courts Reasonable Response to Vexatious Litigant
In Parkland Plaza Vet. Clinics v. Gerard, the court of appeals upheld Waukesha County Judge Ralph Ramirez’s restrictions on Gerard’s access to courts. The court describes Gerard’s “Quixotic tilting at windmills,” and her frequent and unfounded tilting practices. As a result of Gerard’s actions, Judge Ramirez imposed a number of sanctions “designed to protect the court and its staff from her vexatious conduct”:
That the Clerk of Courts for Waukesha County shall no longer accept any filings or correspondence from Gerard or anyone on her behalf;
That any documents or filings that are received by mail are to be sent back to Gerard’s last known address without review by the court or clerk;
That only upon proof of payment in full ($2,538.82) to Parkland Plaza Veterinary clinic S.C., or its attorney Basil Loeb, shall any documents be accepted from Defendant Gerard.
Gerard naturally appealed, and the appellate court upheld Ramirez:
An individual has a due process right of access to the courts, Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 482 N.W.2d 353 (1992), however, that right is not absolute and may be curtailed where a litigant abuses the court system. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting prodigious litigator from filing noncriminal motions). A trial court has “inherent power to protect itself against any action that would unreasonably curtail its powers or materially impair its efficiency.” Jacobson v. Avestruz, 81 Wis. 2d 240, 245, 260 N.W.2d 267 (1977) (citation omitted).
. . . .
We agree with the trial court’s finding that Gerard’s vast and vexatious filings in this case establish Gerard has “a history of non-compliance with court orders, prosecution of frivolous motions, [and] reckless disregard of court orders.” A court faced with a litigant who has engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the court. Minniecheske v. Griesbach, 161 Wis. 2d 743, 748, 468 N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1991). Such restrictions may include barring the litigant from filing further civil actions, aside from habeas corpus, until the litigant has paid fees or costs imposed in the same case or a prior case. Puchner v. Hepperla, 2001 WI App 50, ¶¶6, 10 and n.7, 241 Wis. 2d 545, 625 N.W.2d 609. We are satisfied the trial court’s restriction on future filings by Gerard was appropriately crafted to be a bar only until she paid the sanction previously imposed and well within its discretion given Gerard’s pattern of abusing the court system.
Although unpublished, the court’s reasoning will provide ammunition when faced with an unreasonable chronic filer of lawsuits.
Cannon County Courthouse photo courtesy SeeMidTn.com (aka Brent) flickr gallery under this creative commons license.
